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I. INTRODUCTION 
Richard Posner’s retirement after 36 years on the federal bench presents an 
ideal opportunity to reflect on his sometimes controversial career as a scholar and 
a judge. Judge Posner’s principal scholarly work, Economic Analysis of Law,1 
has been cited by legal scholars over 7,500 times. Given this, one would expect 
him to have had a substantial impact on law.2 This Article considers his impact 
 
 * Jeffrey L. Harrison is a Huber Hurst Eminent Scholar and a Professor of Law at the University of 
Florida College of Law.  
1.  RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (9th ed. 2014) [hereinafter ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS]. All citations are to the ninth edition unless otherwise noted. 
2.  This was determined by a Westlaw search, which considers legal periodicals only, and does not 
include books or citations to Judge Posner’s many other works. Therefore, the number is a substantial 
understatement.  
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on contract law. I conducted two lines of research: one line explores the impact 
of Judge Posner’s scholarly writings on judicial opinions and the other line 
examines the impact of his opinions on other courts. 
This research suggests that Judge Posner’s impact on contract law is minimal 
if “impact” is measured in relation to changes that have occurred in the field. For 
the most part, there is scant evidence that his scholarly writings in the area have 
influenced other judges in more than a few cases.3 Similarly, there is little 
indication that his judicial opinions have influenced other courts.4 Perhaps this is 
explained by the fact that his writing in the field of contracts typically supports 
the status quo.5 Indeed, one interpretation of this research is that Judge Posner 
has supplied insights and rationales in support of the status quo and provided 
courts with new ways to articulate old ideas. In either case, this Article attempts 
to establish Judge Posner’s importance in the evolution of contract law. Perhaps 
it also furthers our insight into the disconnect between legal scholarship and the 
law.6 
Part II of this Article is a brief and critical examination of Judge Posner’s 
view of contract law. Chapter 4 of his book, Economic Analysis of Law, is his 
most comprehensive treatment of this issue.7 Part III considers instances in which 
judicial opinions cite Posner’s primary works. It addresses whether Posner’s 
writings have impacted the path of contract law. Part IV presents a detailed look 
at the impact of his judicial opinions. 
Before beginning, it is important to note some qualifications for the results 
that follow. First, as far as I know, Judge Posner has not claimed that his work 
has been influential to the development of contract law. As already noted, this 
should not be surprising since the theme of much of Posner’s work is that the 
common law reflects an intuitive application of economic reasoning.8 Second, in 
the wake of his most important work, Economic Analysis of Law, many other 
scholars turned to an economic approach to law. These scholars may have had 
some, albeit moderate, influence.9 It is incorrect to view their works as 
 
3.  See infra Part III. 
4.  See infra Part IV. Perhaps this should not be surprising. Eric Posner wrote 15 years ago, “economic 
analysis has failed to produce an ‘economic theory’ of contract law, and does not seem likely to be able to do 
so.” Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE 
L.J. 829, 830 (2003). 
5.  Although impossible to assess, it may be that the impact will be felt in terms of retarding changes in 
the law. 
6.  See generally Jeffrey L. Harrison & Amy R. Mashburn, Citations, Justifications, and the Troubled 
State of Legal Scholarship: An Empirical Study, 3 TEX. A&M L. REV. 45 (2015). 
7.  ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 1, at 95–158. 
8.  Id. at 297; Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 257, 270–71 (1974). 
9.  See Jeffrey L. Harrison, The Influence of Law and Economics Scholarship on Contract Law: 
Impressions Twenty-Five Years Later, 68 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 1 (2012) [hereinafter Influence of Law 
and Economics Scholarship]; Jeffrey L. Harrison, Trends and Traces: A Preliminary Evaluation of Economic 
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derivative, yet the question remains of whether their occasionally influential 
works would have existed but for the pioneering work of Judge Posner. Third, 
and most importantly, although this effort is essentially empirical, it reflects 
certain methodologies and assumptions that are ultimately subjective. Readers 
are encouraged to question both of these and explore possible alternatives. 
II. POSNER’S VIEW OF CONTRACT LAW 
A. Basic Positions and Minor Criticisms 
As one would expect, Judge Posner’s analysis of contract law is centered 
around the goal of efficiency. Accordingly, contract law has five functions: 
(1) to prevent opportunism, (2) to interpolate efficient terms either on a 
either a wholesale or retail basis (gap-filling versus ad hoc 
interpretation), (3) to punish avoidable mistakes in the contracting 
process, (4) to allocate risk to the superior risk bearer, and (5) to reduce 
the costs of resolving contractual disputes.10 
Other than (5)—which seems, in part, to follow from (1) through (4)—this 
Section considers each of these functions along with some additional 
observations about Posner’s positions on promissory estoppel, duress and related 
doctrines, and remedies. The following Subsection presents more general 
criticisms. 
Posner notes that, “The basic aim of contract law is to deter people from 
behaving opportunistically toward their contracting parties, in order to encourage 
optimal timing of economic activity and . . . obviate costly self-protection 
measures.”11 Put differently, contract law decreases the risk of opportunistic 
behavior and, in so doing, lowers transaction costs. Posner expands on the notion 
of opportunism and notes that guarding against it is really a version of guarding 
against monopoly (or monopsony) power.12 This risk arises when performances 
are sequential as opposed to simultaneous. Thus, a builder of a house who is to 
be paid only when the house is finished is at the mercy of the person for whom it 
is built. For example, halfway through construction, the buyer of the house may 
say that he or she will pay 20% less for the house. At that point the builder, who 
has invested substantial personal funds, may consider the alternatives of stopping 
construction or finishing and locating a new buyer. Neither of these options may 
be more attractive than simply accepting the lower price from the opportunistic 
buyer. Contract law avoids this by permitting the builder to hold the buyer 
 
Analysis in Contract Law, 1988 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 73 [hereinafter Trends and Traces]. 
10.  ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 1, at 102. 
11.  Id. at 97. 
12.  Monopsony power involves the possession of leverage on the buying side of the market.  
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responsible for the full amount to which the parties agreed. 
Gap filling, according to Judge Posner, presents opportunities for observing 
efficiency standards. For example, gap filling by courts relieves the parties of 
costly “negotiation and drafting.”13 In effect, contract law contains default rules 
that courts will apply unless the parties opt out of them. Posner portrays these 
default rules as a type of form contract. There are really two questions here: 
Should a court fill the gaps, and if so, how should it fill them? Posner is correct 
that contract law itself serves a useful function in filling the gaps with a set of 
default rules. The issue of how one fills the gap, however, is another matter. 
Here, Posner makes a leap of faith by noting that an efficient term should fill the 
gap because the parties likely would have agreed to doing that.14 His logic is that 
filling the gap with an efficient term means maximizing the surplus created by 
the contract and that both parties will benefit. 
It is interesting to visualize this in the context of an actual case. In American 
Land Holdings of Indiana, LLC v. Jobe,15 (a Posner opinion) the dispute was 
between a landowner and a mining company. The issue was whether a grant to 
the mining company included the right to strip mine the land. The contractual 
provision in question granted the right to “‘all the coals, clays minerals, and 
mineral substances underlying’ the defendant’s land, ‘together with the right to 
mine and remove said coals.’”16 The court deemed the clause ambiguous, thus 
creating an opportunity for gap filling. The court filled the gap by holding that 
the clause did not permit strip mining. 
Posner’s approach to the problem was to imagine the parties back at the time 
of negotiating the contract. Someone stops them in mid negotiation and notes that 
the clause might be ambiguous and asks “what do you mean?” The problem with 
this approach is that the parties would not simply have inserted a clause that 
indicates whether strip mining is allowed. They would have discovered that they 
disagree. The landowner will claim it does not include strip mining and the 
mining company will insist that it does. In all likelihood, resolution of the dispute 
would require revising the contract so that both parties are satisfied. For example, 
the landowner will certainly demand more if the land is strip mined, and the 
mining company will ultimately pay more or the contract negotiation will fail. 
The logic of Posner’s gap filling argument is not compelling. First, as noted 
in the example, the parties would have renegotiated had they thought of it, which 
would mean the terms would change for both sides. Courts, however, do not hold 
that one side’s definition is the correct one and then adjust the whole bargain. 
 
13.  ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 1, at 99. 
14.  This point is made more succinctly in the seventh edition of the Economic Analysis of Law, RICHARD 
A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 96–97 (7th ed. 2007) [hereinafter ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 7TH ED.], 
and is made less directly in the ninth edition in which Posner lists as one of the functions of contract law to 
“interpolate efficient terms.” ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 1, at 102. 
15.  604 F.3d 451 (7th Cir. 2010).  
16.  Id. at 454. 
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Second, if the goal is to replicate what the parties would have done, there is little 
reason to believe they would have maximized the surplus created by the 
exchange as opposed to each seeking to maximize their individual returns.17 In 
fact, in any contract in which one party has monopoly or monopsony power, it is 
unlikely that the total surplus will be maximized.18 Third, the idea of filling the 
gap with the most efficient term suggests there is one generally accepted  concept 
of efficiency and that judges are equipped to discover it. Both of these 
assumptions are questionable. 
Posner’s gap filling approach of asking what the parties would have done 
extends to allocating the risk to the superior risk-bearer in cases of 
impracticability19 and mutual mistake.20 Here, Posner argues that the party who 
could have avoided or insured against the unexpected event at the lowest cost 
would have assumed the risk, had it been considered. The point is that the parties, 
had they thought about it, would have agreed to the efficient allocation of the 
risk. Again, Posner falls into the trap of assuming the parties would seek to 
maximize the total or joint return from the contract as opposed to individual 
returns. Moreover, had they thought about it, the party assuming the risk would 
have demanded compensation. 
The purpose of “punishing”21 those who make avoidable mistakes in the 
formation process raises questions about how to handle the risk of mistake in 
formation. For example, a seller mismarks the price on a rare coin or baseball 
card. The buyer notices the bargain and buys the item at a low cost. The default 
position is that the party who is the lowest cost-avoider of the mistake should 
bear the burden.22 The goal is to decrease incidents of miscommunication by 
imposing the risk on those who could avoid the mistake at the lower cost. While 
assigning the risk of mistakes to those best able to avoid them is desirable, it is 
not clear whether it is consistent with overall efficiency. One of the underlying 
premises of Posner’s analysis is that we want contracts to be a method of 
assuring that goods eventually reach the hands of those who value them the most. 
Punishing the party who could avoid the mistake may be inconsistent with this 
goal. The mismarked item may be scooped up by someone who values it at a 
fraction of its highest value. Although subsequent transactions might result in this 
eventual allocation, it also means increased transaction costs. 
Judge Posner offers a weak and likely obsolete defense of promissory 
 
17.  Posner recognizes this, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 7TH ED., supra note 14, at 96–97, but maintains that the 
best chance to enrich oneself is to increase the size of the surplus.  
18.  One of the principle objections to the use of monopoly power is that it fails to maximize total surplus. 
See E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST AND ITS ECONOMIC 
IMPLICATIONS 23–25 (5th ed. 2013). There is little reason to think this would be different in the case of 
individual transactions. 
19.  ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 1, at 112. 
20.  Id. at 108–09. 
21.  Here, it seems clear that Judge Posner does not equate punishing with imposing punitive damages.  
22.  ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 1, at 108. 
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estoppel.23 His example is that of a wealthy person who promises to pay 
someone’s way through college. The promisee then relies on the promise and 
quits his job. According to Posner, the wealthy person should be required to pay 
under the reasoning that the promise “induced reliance that cost the promisee 
heavily when it was broken, and such a cost can be avoided for the future by 
holding such a promisor liable for the promisee’s cost of having relied.”24 The 
question is whether a rule that one must not rely on gratuitous promises might be 
more efficient. Specifically, if courts never enforced these promises, the cost of 
relying on them would almost certainly decline. This would also eliminate the 
legal costs of determining whether a claimant has satisfied all the elements of a 
promissory estoppel claim.25 
Perhaps Judge Posner’s more interesting comments deal with duress, related 
doctrines, and remedies. He notes that subjecting people to duress should be 
discouraged not because people are unable to exercise their free will, but because 
we have a more generalized preference not to be subject to extortion.26 Thus, a 
contract completed at gun point is not avoidable because you were robbed of 
your free will, but because we want to discourage, as a general matter, the use of 
resources to put people in situations in which they have little choice. His 
reasoning regarding duress seems circular—the reason we dislike extortion is 
because it eliminates the options we have if we are to exercise free will. 
Nevertheless, he does find an efficiency justification for not enforcing contracts 
entered into under duress in that we want to discourage the flow of resources into 
making threats and guarding against them.27 Those uses may have only 
distributive effects but, according to Posner, do not advance overall social 
welfare. 
Posner’s concept of duress is narrow.28 For example, it is not duress if the 
source of the duress is not the advantage-taker. From the standpoint of 
discouraging investment in duress-causing efforts, this makes sense. The 
merchant who charges high prices to people with few choices arguably is not 
responsible for their plight; allowing avoidance would not lead to a decrease in 
the source of the duress. However, it does not make sense in terms of decreasing 
investment in guarding against duress. A vulnerable party wishing to avoid 
 
23.  Id. at 101. 
24.  Id. 
25.  Judge Posner offers a more compelling rationale for promissory estoppel in his article, Richard A. 
Posner, Gratuitous Promises in Economics and Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 411 (1977) [hereinafter Gratuitous 
Promises]. Suppose you wanted to give someone $100. In a regime without promissory estoppel, the actual 
promise would have to be for more because the promisee would discount the value of your promise. So, you 
might have to promise $125 to actually create the perception of a $100 promise. If there is promissory estoppel, 
the promise could be for $100 because very little or no discounting would take place.  
26.  ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 1, at 123. 
27.  Id. 
28.  Id. at 123–27. 
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advantage-taking likely has little insight into the source of the duress and, to the 
extent possible, must invest to avoid a more generalized threat. On the related 
notion of unconscionability, Posner adopts the standard law and economics point 
of view that widespread use of unconscionability can reduce the available options 
for less well-off individuals.29 
On remedies, Posner is a proponent of the notion that expectancy damages 
are consistent with the so-called efficient breach.30 He seems less supportive of 
liquidated damages and specific performance. With respect to liquidated damages 
clauses, Posner observes, “There are good reasons for not awarding punitive 
damages for the non-opportunistic breach of contract . . . . But there are not good 
reasons for refusing to enforce voluntarily negotiated penalty clauses.”31 He 
views a penalty clause as a way for a party who may appear risky to his or her 
counterpart to overcome reluctance to assume that risk. On specific performance 
he appears to view the current policy of applying it to real property transactions 
as consistent with efficiency.32 
Posner’s qualms about liquidated damages and specific performance are 
related to the impact they may have on the efficient breach. This requires some 
explanation. Suppose A contracts to sell a car to B for $2,000. The market value 
is $2,200. C comes into the picture and personally values the car at $2,500 and 
makes that offer to A. Under the efficient breach theory, A would sell the car to 
C, pay damages of $200 to B, and be better off. In fact, all three parties would be 
better off or no worse off after the breach than they would have been had the 
contract been performed. 
On the other hand, suppose A and B have a clause that says A is to pay $800 
in liquidated damages if the car is not delivered to B. A cannot pay B $800 and 
profit from the breach, and it will not occur. There is, however, an alternative to 
delivering the car or paying liquidated damages. Rather than breach, A could 
approach B and ask what it would take to relieve A of the obligation under the 
clause. For example, he could offer B $400. This would make B better off than 
delivery of the car, which only nets him a $200 benefit of the bargain. In fact, 
there is a range of prices that A could offer B for release from the clause that 
would allow the “efficient breach” (no longer a breach since it would be with B’s 
blessing) to occur. Posner’s concern is that the bilateral monopoly relationship of 
the parties may prevent this exchange from occurring.33 In the example, there is 
one potential “buyer” of the right to be released from the clause and one potential 
seller. Under these conditions, the parties may negotiate, bluff, and ultimately fail 
to agree.34 
 
29.  Id. at 127. 
30.  Id. at 129. 
31.  Id. at 140. 
32.  Id. at 145–46. 
33.  Id. at 140. 
34.  The frequency of parties to agree under conditions of bilateral monopoly is an empirical question.  
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In the case of specific performance, the argument has similar steps. Suppose 
now the car is unique and B is likely to be awarded specific performance. Still 
the car is only worth $2,200 to B. Specific performance would keep the car from 
finding its way to C. The parties could bargain around this. A could say, “I will 
deliver the car and you will be $200 ahead or I can make you $400 ahead and I 
will transfer the car to C.” Again, there is one buyer and one seller along with the 
possibility of a stalemate that would prevent the more efficient outcome from 
occurring. 
B. General Observations 
Judge Posner’s most extensive treatment of contract law teeters between 
advocating that the law is efficient as-is and wishful thinking. On the latter point, 
Posner observes that courts are using the doctrine of unconscionability less 
frequently35—something he sees as consistent with efficiency—while, in fact, the 
opposite seems to be the case.36 There are, however, larger issues with the 
analysis which this Article will briefly address. They deal with the notions of 
opportunism, efficiency, and remedies. 
First, as already noted, Posner views contract law’s primary purpose as 
avoiding opportunism—advantage-taking that does not increase overall welfare. 
His opportunism seems confined to behavior after the contract is made. In fact, a 
great deal of contract law is a response to opportunism at the point of contracting. 
Although not listed by Judge Posner as one of the purposes of contract law, 
contract law limits means of persuasion.37  In fact, a leading contracts casebook 
devotes a substantial chapter to the subject of “policing the bargaining process.”38 
Measures that police the bargain can be about efficiency, but they often deal 
directly with distributive outcomes. To serve basic ideas of fairness, courts have 
employed notions of capacity, duress, public policy, undue influence, 
unconscionability, and misrepresentation. Courts have also used standard 
contract doctrines to address unfairness in exchanges.39 A single-minded 
 
35.  This statement is found in the seventh edition, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 7TH ED., supra note 14, at 117, 
but is not found in the ninth edition, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 1. It is not clear whether Judge Posner 
found empirical evidence to refute his initial statement or realized he had no evidence either way.  
36.  See Jeffrey L. Harrison, Defects in Consent and Dividing the Benefit of the Bargain: Recent 
Developments, 53 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 193 (2015). 
37.  THOMAS F. COTTER & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, LAW AND ECONOMICS: POSITIVE, NORMATIVE AND 
BEHAVIORAL PERSPECTIVES 276–81 (3d ed. 2013). 
38.  E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 339–404 (8th ed. 2013). 
39.  This is noted in the comment to § 2-302 of the U.C.C., which addresses unconscionability. The 
comment reads: 
This section is intended to make it possible for the courts to police explicitly against the contracts or 
clauses which they find to be unconscionable. In the past such policing has been accomplished by 
adverse construction of language, by manipulation of the rules of offer and acceptance or by 
determinations that the clause is contrary to public policy or to the dominant purpose of the contract. 
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emphasis on efficiency, as Posner seems to view it, is an incomplete version of 
the functions of contract law. 
Second, Judge Posner’s notions of efficiency are fuzzy. He cites a number of 
sources of efficiency. For example, without contract law, parties would have to 
take more expensive measures to avoid opportunistic behavior. Gap filling by 
courts lowers the costs of negotiation and drafting. In addition, by lowering 
transaction costs, a system of contract law helps insure that goods go to their 
most valued users. Courts can use contract rules to assign a variety of risks to the 
party better able to avoid their consequences or insure against them. In all 
instances, efficiency means either lowering costs or increasing benefits. 
Costs in the context of contracts can have the same three layers as costs in 
the context of torts, as explained by Guido Calabresi.40 Primary costs are the 
costs we observe. Secondary costs concern how parties actually feel the costs.41 
They are “the costs of bearing the costs of accidents.”42 For example, a court 
could impose a $20 fine could impose on a homeless person or on Bill Gates. 
Most would agree that the actual suffering would be greater for the homeless 
person.  Finally, there are costs of administering the system. Posner seems 
disinclined to recognize secondary costs in particular.43 All three types of costs 
are relevant in contract law. 
The same analysis is applicable to benefits. Primary benefits are the ones we 
can monetize. Secondary benefits are determined by the actual impact of the 
benefit. Thus, finding a $20 bill on the street is likely to be of greater benefit to 
the homeless person who is able to buy necessities than to Bill Gates who may 
actually lose money by spending the time it takes to pick up a $20 bill. 
The importance of these layers of costs and benefits can be understood by 
focusing on the allocation of risk in the case of impossibility or impracticability. 
In these instances, the real decision is who will bear the loss. For example, 
suppose the contract is to build a house in Houston, Texas for $300,000. After 
the house is half-way completed at a cost of $150,000, it is completely destroyed 
by a hurricane. Under Posner’s approach, the decision to excuse the contractor or 
not would be based on how the risk would have been allocated if the parties had 
considered it. If it were assigned to the owner, the contractor would be excused. 
If assigned to the contractor, performance would not be excused. If they had 
thought about it, they may have both consulted an insurer. Suppose the contractor 
could buy insurance for $100 and the homeowner for $150. With this information 
at the bargaining table, the contractor would not be excused.44 It is important to 
 
U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010). 
40.  GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 53 (1970). 
41.  Id. at 40–54. Posner apparently discounts this as referring to the “distribution” of costs, but 
distribution has true efficiency implications in terms of the utility of those who absorb these costs. 
42.  JULES COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 204 (2002).  
43.  Richard A. Posner, Guido Calabresi’s The Costs of Accidents: A Reassessment, 64 MD. L. REV. 12, 
15 (2005).   
44.  The contractor would accept any amount in excess of $100 to assume the risk and the homeowner 
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remember that when the issue arises no one has actually insured the house. This 
means if the contractor bears the risk, the contractor will have to start the project 
over or be liable for a breach. This, however, focuses only on primary costs. Take 
it one more step and assume the homeowner is Donald Trump, who is building a 
cottage for a distant relative. The contractor is a small and new sole 
proprietorship and this is only his second project. If secondary costs are 
considered, it may be that the efficient allocation of the risk is to the homeowner. 
The Posner analysis looks only at one layer of costs. 
Before turning to the question of whether Judge Posner has influenced 
contract law, one additional, albeit minor, criticism is in order. As noted, Judge 
Posner warns that penalty clauses and specific performance may prevent what is 
known as the efficient breach. The problem is that in order to overcome the 
possible inefficiencies of those remedies, the parties must bargain under 
conditions of bilateral monopoly. In theory, there is no stable outcome under 
these conditions. The parties are stuck with each other and both parties know the 
other party has no alternatives. Under these conditions there is a danger of an 
impasse leaving both parties worse off. How often parties end up in a stalemate 
under these conditions is an empirical question, and it seems likely that Judge 
Posner overstates the danger.45 
III. THE IMPACT OF POSNER’S SCHOLARSHIP ON JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING 
Of all of Judge Posner’s writings, the most important one is Economic 
Analysis of Law. A Westlaw search in late fall 2017 using the terms “Posner” and 
“Economic Analysis of Law” indicates that the book has been cited in 283 
opinions.46 This includes all cases regardless of the subject matter. When I added 
the term “contract!” to the search, the number drops to 205. Obviously, the fact 
that some form of the word “contract” is included in an opinion does not mean 
the case is concerned with contract law. Nor does the absence of the term mean 
that a case may not ultimately be about contract law. For example, a case about a 
lease may not include the word contract. Thus, I searched for cases that cited the 
book and used the term “lease,” but did not use the term “contract!” This yielded 
three additional cases. To expand the sample, I afforded the same treatment to 
four additional works. These works were:  Impossibility and Related Doctrines in 
Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, by Posner and Rosenfield;47 The 
 
would pay up to $150 to avoid the risk. 
45.  Experimental evidence suggest that impasses are not a frequent occurrence. See Elizabeth Hoffman 
& Matthew L. Spitzer, The Coase Theorem: Some Experimental Tests, 25 J. L. ECON. 73 (1982); see also 
Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, Entitlements, Rights, and Fairness: An Experimental Examination of 
Subjects’ Concepts of Distributive Justice, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 259 (1985). 
46.  By contrast, the book has been cited over 7,500 times by legal scholars. This raises the issue 
addressed elsewhere of the relevance of legal scholarship. See Harrison & Mashburn, supra note 6, at 45.   
47.  Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: 
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Economics of Contract Law, by Posner and Kronman;48 Gratuitous Promises in 
Economics and Law, by Posner;49 and One-Sided Contracts in Competitive 
Consumer Markets, by Bebchuk and Posner.50 Together these four works were 
cited 18 times.51 
I then took two “pruning” steps. First, I examined the headnotes of those 
cases citing one or more of the works to see if the case concerned a contract law 
issue. Second, I read the cases addressing a contract law issue to determine if the 
contract law issue was a significant issue as opposed to a minor one. This 
narrowed the sample to 68 cases.52 It was apparent that “citation” did not mean 
the cited work was relied on in a substantive way. Courts frequently offered 
gratuitous cites or asides—those that do not seem to inform the opinion or the 
reasoning of the court.53 These cites, for want of a better description, leave the 
reader wondering “so what?” In other words, the issue was not simply whether 
the author cited Economic Analysis of Law or the other works, but whether the 
citation mattered. 
This distinction is important. As an example, take the notion of “efficient 
breach.” If a person enters the search terms “Posner,” “efficient breach,” and 
“Economic Analysis of Law” into a Westlaw search, the search will return 17 
cases in which all three terms are found.54 Although it is possible that the citation 
 
An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1977). 
48.  ANTHONY T. KRONMAN & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW (1979). 
49.  Gratuitous Promises, supra note 25, at 411. 
50.  Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive Consumer Markets, 
104 MICH. L. REV. 827 (2006).  
51.  These results can be replicated by using the titles as search terms in WestLaw. 
52.  This is consistent with a 2011 survey that found that Economic Analysis of Law was cited in 68 cases 
that dealt with contract law, whether or not the actual case itself was related to the contractual issue. See 
Influence of Law and Economics Scholarship, supra note 9, at 3. 
 Other law and economic works with substantial citation include: Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the 
Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947 (1984) (18 citations); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated 
Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory 
of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554 (1977) (22 citations). See Influence of Law and Economics 
Scholarship, supra note 9. 
53.  An example of this type of citation is Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219 (1995), which 
includes the following:  
The ADA, as we recognized in Morales, 504 U.S., at 378, 112 S.Ct., at 2034, was designed to 
promote “maximum reliance on competitive market forces.” 49 U.S.C.App. § 1302(a)(4). Market 
efficiency requires effective means to enforce private agreements. See Farber, Contract Law and 
Modern Economic Theory, 78 Nw.U.L.Rev. 303, 315 (1983) (remedy for breach of contract “is 
necessary in order to ensure economic efficiency”); R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 90–91 
(4th ed. 1992) (legal enforcement of contracts is more efficient than a purely voluntary system). As 
stated by the United States: “The stability and efficiency of the market depend fundamentally on the 
enforcement of agreements freely made, based on needs perceived by the contracting parties at the 
time.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 23. That reality is key to sensible construction of the 
ADA.  
Id. at 230. 
54.  Search Results, WESTLAW, 
https://1.next.westlaw.com/Search/Results.html?query=%22Posner%22%20%26%20%22efficient%20breach%
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to Economic Analysis of Law in these cases may have little to do with the 
efficient breach, further examination reveals that in all but three cases the two 
terms were linked. On the other hand, it seems likely that compensatory damages 
would have been awarded anyway given long standing precedent.55 It is wrong to 
attribute the idea of expectancy damages to Judge Posner. Moreover, the fact that 
the term “efficient breach” has entered into the picture probably has not 
influenced the law with respect to awarding compensatory damages.56 
I examined all 68 citations to assess the importance of the influence of Judge 
Posner’s work. “Importance,” however, is a fuzzy standard and I refined the 
analysis one more step. I examined each citation to see if it was merely 
gratuitous,57 provided some useful information about the reasoning of the court,58 
or seemed to directly influence the outcome.59 These judgements are highly 
subjective and, hopefully, readers will make their own evaluations. 
In the case of the article, “Gratuitous Promises in Economics and Law,” there 
was one citation and it was classified as gratuitous.”60 The book with Kronman, 
The Economics of Contract Law, was cited nine times.61 In none of these 
instances does it appear the authors’ observations caused a court to rethink a 
 
22%20%26%20%22Economic%20Analysis%20of%20Law%22&jurisdiction=ALLCASES&contentType=CA
SE&querySubmissionGuid=i0ad6ad3b00000165723a95a64fa48fc9&startIndex=1&searchId=i0ad6ad3b000001
65723a95a64fa48fc9&originationContext=SearchListView&transitionType=ListViewType&contextData=(sc.S
earch) (last visited Aug. 25, 2018) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
55.  O. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897) (“The duty to keep a contract 
at common law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep it,—and nothing else.”). See 
generally Jeffrey L. Harrison, A Nihilistic View of the Efficient Breach, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 167 [hereinafter 
Nihilistic View]. 
56.  On the other hand, it is possible that Judge Posner has publicized a new way to justify expectancy 
damages. 
57.  See supra text accompanying note 53; e.g., SSC Manager, LLC v. Venezia FC 1907 LP, No. 17-
1042, 2017 WL 3225851, at *11 n.4 (E.D. Pa. July 27, 2017) (quoting RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW 175 (8th ed. 2011) [hereinafter ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 8TH ED.], who illuminated “the 
inappropriateness of applying the participation doctrine to contractual claims” when he wrote, “A contract gives 
one a right only against the other party to the contract. A tort right, like a property right—which tort rights 
frequently serve to enforce—is a right against the whole world, enabling one to obtain damages from (for 
example) a trespasser on one’s property with whom one had no previous agreement limiting his right to enter 
the property. It would be infeasible to make a contract with every potential trespasser to protect oneself against 
trespass.”). 
58.  An example is SSC Manager, LLC, 2017 WL 3225851, at *11 n.4, which is as follows: 
The following excerpt from an article by Richard Posner further illuminates the inappropriateness of 
applying the participation doctrine to contractual claims: “A contract gives one a right only against 
the other party to the contract. A tort right, like a property right—which tort rights frequently serve 
to enforce—is a right against the whole world, enabling one to obtain damages from (for example) a 
trespasser on one’s property with whom one had no previous agreement limiting his right to enter the 
property. It would be infeasible to make a contract with every potential trespasser to protect oneself 
against trespass.” 
Id. (quoting ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 8TH ED., supra note 57, at 175). 
59.  See infra text accompanying note 66.   
60.  U.S. v. Meadors, 753 F.2d 590, 596 (7th Cir. 1985). 
61.  The search terms “Kronman” and “The Economics of Contract Law” were used.  
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position it was predisposed to take. In effect, the work supported the status quo. 
The article by Posner and Rosenfield was cited eight times.62 The essence of the 
article is that, in cases of impossibility and related doctrines, courts should 
determine excuse by evaluating who is able to bear the risk of the unexpected 
event.63 It is difficult to conclude that the article led a court to decide a case 
differently from how the case would have come out under existing law. On the 
other hand, a few courts have embraced the article’s reasoning.64 
Focusing on the citations to Economic Analysis of Law, there appear to be 13 
instances in which Judge Posner’s work was cited and seemed to influence the 
outcome of the case or the opinion of at least one judge.65 I examined these 13 
cases to determine if there were any specific aspects of contract law that Judge 
Posner influenced or whether they were simply scattered instances of citation. A 
close reading of these cases suggests that Judge Posner’s scholarly work, while 
influential in individual cases, has had little systematic influence on contract law. 
For example, Judge Posner’s work influenced North Carolina courts in 
developing the doctrine of implied habitability. The court quoted Posner’s 
economic rationale: 
Further, by virtue of superior knowledge, skill, and experience in the 
construction of houses, a builder-vendor is generally better positioned 
than the purchaser to know whether a house is suitable for habitation. He 
also is better positioned to evaluate and guard against the financial risk 
posed by a defective septic system, and to absorb and spread across the 
market of home purchasers the loss therefrom. In terms of risk 
distribution analysis, he is the preferred or “least cost” risk bearer. 
Finally, he is in a superior position to develop or utilize technology to 
prevent such defects; and as one commentator has noted, “the major 
pockets of strict liability in the law” derive from “cases where the 
potential victims . . . are not in a good position to make adjustments that 
 
62.  The search terms “Posner,” “Rosenfeld,” and “Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: 
An Economic Analysis” were used. 
63.  See Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 47. 
64.  See, e.g., Assoc’d Gas Distribs. v. F.E.R.C., 824 F.2d 981, 1016–17 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Franconia 
Two, LP v. Omniguru Sys., Inc., 82 Va. Cir. 256, *4 (2011). 
65.  Bidlack v. Wheelabrator Corp., 993 F.2d 603, 612 (7th Cir. 1993); Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 
F.2d 429, 438 (7th Cir. 1987); A&S Transp. Co. v. Tug Fajardo, 688 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1982); Dynamic Mach. 
Works, Inc. v. Mach. & Elec. Consultants, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 2d 83, 89 (D. Mass. 2005); Freeman & Mills, Inc., 
v. Belcher Oil Co., 900 P.2d 669, 682 (Cal. 1995); Tusch Enters. v. Coffin, 740 P.2d 1022, 1032–33 (Idaho 
1987); Campbell v. Leaseway Customized Transp., Inc., 484 N.W.2d 41, 45 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992); S. Real Est. 
& Fin. Co. v. City of St. Louis, 758 S.W.2d 75, 93 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); Kutzin v. Pirnie, 591 A.2d 932, 941 
(N.J. 1991); St. Barnabas Med. Ctr. v. Cty. of Essex, 543 A.2d 34, 44–45 (N.J. 1988); City of Cape May v. St. 
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 524 A.2d 882, 886 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987); Gaito v. Auman, 318 S.E.2d 
555, 559 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984); George v. Veach, 313 S.E.2d 920, 924 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984); Chepkevich v. 
Hidden Valley Resort, L.P., 2 A.3d 1174, 1197 (Pa. 2010); Hill v. Mobile Auto Trim, Inc., 725 S.W.2d 168, 
176 (Tex. 1987) (Gonzalez, J., dissenting). 
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might in the long run reduce or eliminate the risk.”66 
Similarly, a 1987 Idaho decision described the extent of the implied warranty 
of habitability.67 
In City of Cape May v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co.,68 Judge 
Posner’s “superior risk bearer” analysis also seemed to influence the breadth of 
insurance coverage.69 In this case, the court interpreted ambiguities in the policy 
against the insurer.70 There was a clear influence in Dynamic Machine Works, 
Inc. v. Machine & Electric Consultants, Inc.,71 which dealt with Article 2 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code. Specifically, the court relied on Posner’s discussion 
of the functions of contract law with respect to discouraging opportunism and 
encouraging the “optimal timing of economic activity.”72 Posner’s analysis of 
opportunism also played a role in Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc.73 In Pyles v. 
Goller,74 the court relied on Judge Posner to support a holding that a co-owner of 
property to be sold at auction may not bid on the property.75 The importance of a 
contract as a risk-allocating instrument was also discussed in Royal Indemnity 
Co. v. Baker Protective Services, Inc.76 
In a 1993 case, Bidlack v. Wheelabrator Corp.,77 the dispute was between a 
union and former workers. The case involved gap filling and interpretation. 
Judge Posner’s approach of filling the gap with what the parties were likely to 
have agreed upon, if they had thought about it, appeared to influence Judge 
Cudahy’s concurring opinion.78 Similarly, Judge Posner was influential in a 
losing cause. In Southern Real Estate & Financial Co. v. City of St. Louis,79 the 
issue was whether the city possessed the right to destroy a parking garage. A 
dissenting judge relied rather heavily on Judge Posner by arguing that the city did 
not possess the right.80 In another dissenting opinion, the judge relied upon Judge 
 
66.  George v. Veach, 313 S.E.2d 920, 923–24 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) (quoting RICHARD POSNER, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 140–41 (2d ed. 1977)); see also Gaito v. Auman, 318 S.E.2d 555, 559 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 1984). 
67.  Tusch Enters., 740 P.2d at 1032. 
68.  524 A.2d 882 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987). 
69.  Id. at 886. 
70.  Id. 
71.  352 F. Supp. 2d 83 (D. Mass. 2005). 
72.  Dynamic Mach. Works, Inc. v. Mach. & Elec. Consultants, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 2d 83, 89 (D. Mass. 
2005). 
73.  815 F.2d 429, 438 (7th Cir. 1987). 
74.  674 A.2d 35 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996). 
75.  Id. at 42–43 n.9. 
76.  515 N.E.2d 5, 7 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986). 
77.  993 F.2d 603, 612 (7th Cir. 1992).  
78.  Bidlack v. Wheelabrator Corp., 993 F.2d 603, 612 (7th Cir. 1992). 
79.  758 S.W.2d 75 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988). 
80.  758 S.W.2d 75, 93 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988). This was only picked up in this survey as a contracts case 
because it dealt with the interpretation of a lease.  
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Posner’s work to support the argument that a covenant not to compete was 
enforceable.81 
As a general matter, these results seem surprising when the subject of the 
study is someone as prolific as Judge Posner. The fact that legal scholars cited 
Economic Analysis of Law over 7,500 times may make a person wonder whether 
a connection exists between legal scholarship and law.82 Keep in mind this study 
focused entirely on contract law. Also, it does not account for scholars, 
influenced by Judge Posner, whose works the courts cited. Perhaps most 
importantly and as already noted, Judge Posner’s scholarship in the area of 
contracts largely supports the status quo. Given this, maybe it is surprising that 
he has had any additional influence at all. 
IV. THE IMPACT OF JUDGE POSNER’S JUDICIAL OPINIONS ON OTHER COURTS 
I attempted to read all of Judge Posner’s opinions that dealt with contract law 
issues. Westlaw returned 2,785 results for the search terms “The Court of 
Appeals, Posner, Circuit Judge, held” or “The Court of Appeals, Posner, Chief 
Judge, held.”83 When the word “contract!” was added to the search, the number 
fell to 1,112.84 Repeating the same search but substituting “promissory estoppel” 
for “contract!” captures additional cases addressing promissory estoppel.”85 I 
then took two additional, highly subjective pruning steps. First, I read the 
“headnotes” to these cases to determine whether the case addressed contract law 
issues. Initially, I identified approximately 150 cases that fit this description. In 
many instances, there was nothing remarkable about the opinion. Either the rule 
was obvious, Judge Posner adhered to identifiable state law, or the contract law 
issue was minor. I then excluded cases with little analysis. I grouped the 
remaining cases depending on whether they dealt with issues of interpretation 
(including good faith, promissory estoppel, duress and related doctrines), 
remedies, or other topics.86 Aside from remedies, I chose these categories 
because the standards within each one are malleable and allow the application of 
 
81.  Hill v. Mobile Auto Trim, Inc., 725 S.W.2d 168, 176 (Tex. 1987) (Gonzales, J., dissenting); see also 
A&S Transp. Co. v. Tug Fajardo, 688 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1982) (consequential damages); Chepkevich v. Hidden 
Valley Resort, 2 A.3d 1174, 1197 (Pa. 2010) (adhesion contract); Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co., 900 
P.2d 699, 682 (Cal. 1995) (contract or tort theory); Campbell v. Leaseway Customized Transport, Inc., 484 
N.W.2d 41, 45 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (efficient breach).  
82.  See Harrison & Mashburn, supra note 6, at 50. 
83.  Results as of August 2018. 
84.  Search Results, WESTLAW, https://1.next.westlaw.com/Search/Results.html?query=%22The%20Cour 
t%20of%20Appeals%2C%20Posner%2C%20Circuit%20Judge%2C%20held%22%20%26%20%22The%20Co
urt%20of%20Appeals%2C%20Posner%2C%20Circuit%20Judge%2C%20held%22&jurisdiction=ALLCASES
&contentType=CASE&querySubmissionGuid=i0ad6ad3b000001657242a1f3536ce38d&searchId=i0ad6ad3b00
0001657241af1e4fa4922a&transitionType=ListViewType&contextData=(sc.Search) (last visited Aug. 25, 
2018) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
85.  This yielded a single case, Bash v. Firstmark Standard Life Ins. Co., 861 F.2d 159 (7th Cir. 1988). 
86.  The “other topics” cases were not further analyzed because they addressed isolated issues.  
2019 / An Impressionistic and Empirical Evaluation of Richard Posner’s Impact 
on Contract Law 
388 
a judge’s personal points of view. 
A. Interpretation, Gap Filling, and Good Faith 
Courts are often responsible for completing the contract that the parties have 
made. I examined approximately 40 of Judge Posner’s opinions involving 
contract interpretation issues, including good faith.87 A number of strands of 
Judge Posner’s decisions converge in the context of interpretation. For example, 
in Beanstalk Group, Inc. v. AM General Corp., he wrote, “a contract will not be 
interpreted literally if doing so would produce absurd results, in the sense of 
results that the parties, presumed to be rational persons pursuing rational ends, 
are very unlikely to have agreed to seek.”88 Similarly, in Dispatch Automation, 
Inc. v. Richards,89 he observed that “when a contractual interpretation makes no 
economic sense, that’s . . . a compelling reason for rejecting it.”90 Then, in Morin 
Building Products, Judge Posner noted that “[t]he requirement of reasonableness 
is read into a contract not to protect the weaker party but to approximate what the 
parties would have expressly provided with respect to a contingency they did not 
foresee, if they had foreseen it.”91 More generally, “Judicial interpolation of 
missing contractual terms . . . performs an important economic function. . . . 
 
87.  Cincinnati Ins. v. Vita Food Prods., Inc., 808 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2015); Tilstra v. BouMatic LLC, 791 
F.3d 749 (7th Cir. 2015); Visteon Corp. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 777 F.3d 415 (7th Cir. 
2015); Goldberg v. 401 N. Wabash Venture LLC, 755 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 2014); Atl. Cas. Ins. v. Paszko 
Masonry, Inc., 718 F.3d 721 (7th Cir. 2013); R.C. Wegman Constr. Co. v. Admiral Ins., 629 F.3d 724 (7th Cir. 
2011); Am. Land Holdings of Ind., LLC v. Jobe, 604 F.3d 451 (7th Cir. 2010); Est. of Luster v. Allstate Ins., 
598 F.3d 903 (7th Cir. 2010); Vendetti v. Compass Envtl., Inc., 559 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2009); Wis. Elec. Power 
Co. v. Union Pac. R.R., 557 F.3d 504 (7th Cir. 2009); Extra Equipamentos E Esportação Ltda. v. Case Corp., 
541 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 2008); Knutson v. UGS Corp., 526 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2008); Krueger Int’l Inc. v. Royal 
Indem. Co., 481 F.3d 993 (7th Cir. 2007); In re Comdisco, Inc., 434 F.3d 963 (7th Cir. 2006); ConFold Pac., 
Inc. v. Polaris Indus., Inc., 433 F.3d 952 (7th Cir. 2006); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Schumacher Elec. Corp., 415 
F.3d 665 (7th Cir. 2005); Joy v. Hay Grp., Inc., 403 F.3d 875 (7th Cir. 2005); A.M.I. Diamonds Co. v. Hanover 
Ins., 397 F.3d 528 (7th Cir. 2005); Sutter Ins. v. Applied Sys., Inc., 393 F.3d 722 (7th Cir. 2004); Utica Mut. 
Ins. v. Vigo Coal Co., 393 F.3d 707 (7th Cir. 2004); Haslund v. Simon Prop. Grp., Inc., 378 F.3d 653 (7th Cir. 
2004); Foufas v. Dru, 319 F.3d 284 (7th Cir. 2003); Brines v. XTRA Corp., 304 F.3d 699 (7th Cir. 2002); 
Dispatch Automation, Inc. v. Richards, 280 F.3d 1116 (7th Cir. 2002); Hartford Fire Ins. v. St. Paul Surplus 
Lines Ins., 280 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2002); Sutton v. A.O. Smith Co., 165 F.3d 561 (7th Cir. 1999); Brazell v. 
First Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. of Rockford, 982 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1992); First Nat’l Bank of Chi. v. Atl. Tele-
Network Co., 946 F.2d 516 (7th Cir. 1991); Mkt. St. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1991); 
Residential Mktg. Grp., Inc. v. Granite Inv. Grp., 933 F.2d 546 (7th Cir. 1991); Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Pittsburgh 
Corning Corp., 917 F.2d 297 (7th Cir. 1990); Patton v. Mid-Continent Sys., Inc., 841 F.2d 742 (7th Cir. 1988); 
Empire Gas Corp. v. Am. Bakeries Co., 840 F.2d 1333 (7th Cir. 1988); City of Clinton, Ill. v. Moffitt, 812 F.2d 
341 (7th Cir. 1987); Matterhorn, Inc. v. NCR Corp., 763 F.2d 866 (7th Cir. 1985); Morin Bldg. Prods. Co. v. 
Baystone Constr., Inc., 717 F.2d 413 (7th Cir. 1983); Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. City of Sheboygan Falls, 
713 F.2d 1261 (7th Cir. 1983). 
88.  283 F.3d 856, 860 (7th Cir. 2002).  
89.  280 F.3d 1116 (7th Cir. 2002). 
90.  Id. at 1119. 
91.  Morin Bldg. Prods. Co. v. Baystone Constr., Inc., 717 F.2d 413, 415 (7th Cir. 1983). 
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Contracts would be thousands of pages long if the parties had to anticipate and 
provide for every contingency.”92 Finally, Judge Posner has made it clear that he 
believes the reasonable term is the most efficient one.93 
It makes sense to distinguish pure gap filling where a term is missing or 
exceedingly vague from attributing meaning to a term actually in the contract. In 
the case of the latter, Judge Posner’s view is to interpret the term in an 
economically sensible way but not necessarily to substitute an efficient term.94 
This is consistent with his view that a court should observe the intentions of the 
parties, even if the term is not efficient. With regard to the intentions of the 
parties, he wrote: 
Interpreting contracts to make economic sense is a method of contract 
interpretation that we have commended in other cases. . . . It rests on the 
commonsensical observation that people usually don’t pay a price for a 
good or service that is wildly in excess of its market value, or sell a good 
or service (here insurance) for a price hugely less than its market value 
. . . .95 
The key notion here is common sense, and this view hardly deviates from what a 
person would expect from even a non-economically oriented judge. 
In cases where a gap existed, I was unable to locate an instance in which 
Judge Posner expressly filled the gap with a term that the parties would have 
agreed to and which he deemed efficient. Nevertheless, he was able to adhere to 
this goal and to his scholarship by characterizing the contract, once made, as a 
type of partnership. This is most evident in Market Street Associates Ltd. 
Partnership v. Frey,96 a 1991 case dealing the requirements of good faith. In that 
case, a clause in a lease agreement allowed the lessee to buy the property for 
what turned out to be a below market value price if the lessor and lessee were 
unable to agree on the financing of improvements.97 The lessor did not appear to 
know of the provision, and the lessee did not point it out.98 The question was 
whether good faith required the lessee to point out the clause that permitted them 
to buy at a lower than market price if the financing arrangement were not agreed 
to.99 Judge Posner explained that the “concept of the duty of good faith like the 
 
92.  Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Schumacher Elec. Corp., 415 F.3d 665, 670 (7th Cir. 2005) (citations 
omitted). 
93.  See supra text accompanying notes 13–20.  
94.  ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 1, at 100. 
95.  Hartford Fire Ins. v. St. Paul Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 280 F.3d 744, 747 (7th Cir. 2002) (citations 
omitted).   
96.  941 F.2d 588, 589 (7th Cir. 1991). 
97.  Id. 
98.  Id. at 598. 
99.  The case was remanded for a determination of whether the lessee had reason to know of the 
ignorance of the lessor. On remand the lower court denied the lessee/plaintiff’s request for specific 
performance. Mkt. St. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Frey, 817 F. Supp. 784, 788 (E.D. Wis. 1993). On appeal the 
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concept of fiduciary duty is a stab at approximating the terms the parties would 
have negotiated had they foreseen the circumstances that gave rise to their 
dispute.”100 
He goes on to reason that, having made a contract, the parties have entered 
into a cooperative arrangement.101 In that context, the parties are not adversaries, 
and there is no socially beneficial reason to allow one partner to take advantage 
of an oversight by the other contractual partner.102 Consequently, “The office of 
the doctrine of good faith is to forbid the kinds of opportunistic behavior that a 
mutually dependent, cooperative relationship might enable in the absence of 
rule.”103 The parties, like shareholders in a corporation, are expected to perform 
in a manner that advances the ends of the contract. The gap filling that took place 
in this case was an implied term that mistakes of one party could not be 
deliberately taken advantage of by the other party to the contract. Under the 
Posner approach, the parties would have agreed to this term had they thought 
about it.104 
Judge Posner’s reasoning seems forced and is actually more consistent with a 
prior opinion in which he characterized good faith as a chameleon.105 It is fine to 
view the parties as having a partnership-like relationship once they form a 
contract. This idea is not new.106 The problem is that the gap-filling process is 
one that asks what they would have included in the contract when they were in a 
bargaining posture. That envisions a situation in which they are hardly partners 
wishing to maximize the profits of their joint venture. Instead, the term the 
parties would have adopted is one that reflects a give and take with each party 
attempting to maximize individual profit. In effect, Judge Posner might have 
adopted the view that the parties have agreed to cooperate, but this is not the 
same as filling the gap with what they would have done at the outset. 
Judge Posner’s opinion in Market Street Associates, and his articulation of a 
good faith standard, has been widely cited,107 and appears to be consistent with 
 
Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the lessee had not acted in good faith. Mkt. St. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. 
Frey, 21 F.3d 782, 784 (7th Cir. 1994). 
100.  Mkt. St. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 941 F.2d at 595. 
101.  Id. at 594. 
102.  Id. 
103.  Id. at 595. 
104.  Judge Posner’s position seems to be influenced by the work of Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract 
and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARV, L. REV. 369, 371 (1980).  
105.  Empire Gas Corp. v. Am. Bakeries Co., 840 F.2d 1333, 1339 (7th Cir. 1988). 
106.  Jeffrey L. Harrison, A Case for Loss Sharing, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 573, 595 (1983). 
107.   By the late fall of 2017, the case had been cited 204 times, mostly for the good faith interpretation. 
Search Results, WESTLAW, 
https://1.next.westlaw.com/RelatedInformation/I596da59494c011d993e6d35cc61aab4a/kcCitingReferences.htm
l?sortType=depthdesc&facetGuid=h562dbc1f9a5f4b0c9e54031a19076b9c&midlineIndex=39&originationCont
ext=citingreferences&transitionType=CitingReferences&contextData=%28sc.Keycite%29 (last visited Aug. 25, 
2018) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
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his personal views as expressed in Economic Analysis of Law. Although this 
appears to be Judge Posner’s most important offering (as far as the definitions of 
good faith and gap filling), two factors cut against the view that Judge Posner has 
influenced contract law. First is the distinct possibility that the common law had, 
through an evolutionary process, already adopted the what-they-would-have-
done-had-they-thought-about-it approach. In 1980, Steven J. Burton published an 
extensive study of the common law duty of good faith,108 which Judge Posner 
cites to in Market Street Associates.109 Professor Burton wrote, “Discretion in 
performance may be exercised legitimately for the purposes reasonably 
contemplated by the parties, including ordinary business reasons. It cannot be 
exercised for the purpose of recapturing forgone opportunities, for such conduct 
harms the expectation interest of the dependent party.”110 Good faith, as 
interpreted by Professor Burton, is consistent with Judge Posner’s description. 
Interestingly, courts have cited Professor Burton’s article 98 times.111 Only eight 
of those citations preceded Judge Posner’s Market Street Associates citation to 
his article. 
The possibility that Judge Posner’s role provided an accessible articulation of 
pre-existing law is further supported by his Market Street Associates opinion’s 
reliance on Judge Easterbrook’s opinion in Kham & Nate’s Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. 
First Bank of Whiting.112 In that case, Judge Easterbrook wrote, “‘Good faith’ is a 
compact reference to an implied undertaking not to take opportunistic advantage 
in a way that could not have been contemplated at the time of drafting . . . .”113 
Nevertheless, Posner’s articulation has obviously been influential. In sum, it 
appears that Judge Posner did not change the common law with respect to good 
faith, but he did provide an expression that other courts have followed. In 
addition, although it is conjecture, he may have exposed Professor Burton’s work 
to other judges. What is generally absent, however, in those other judge’s 
opinions is the sense that the parties, had they thought about it, would have 
selected an efficient term. 
B. Promissory Estoppel 
Promissory estoppel is related to good faith in the sense that it concerns basic 
honesty. A promise-breaker engages in opportunistic behavior by changing his or 
 
108.  Burton, supra note 104, at 373. 
109.  Mkt. St. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 594 (7th Cir. 1991). 
110.  Burton, supra note 104, at 403. 
111.  Citing References, WESTLAW, https://1.next.westlaw.com/RelatedInformation/I0e0190714a0f11db9 
9a18fc28eb0d9ae/kcCitingReferences.html?docSource=0411ad09ce3048799b4b851ea7e9a2aa&rank=1&page
Number=1&sortType=dateasc&sortOrder=dateasc&facetGuid=h562dbc1f9a5f4b0c9e54031a19076b9c&transiti
onType=ListViewType&contextData=(sc.Search) (last visited Aug. 25, 2018) (on file with The University of 
the Pacific Law Review). 
112.  908 F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th Cir. 1990). 
113.  Id. This excerpt is quoted by Judge Posner, Mkt. St. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 941 F.2d at 595. 
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her mind to the detriment of others. The establishment of promissory estoppel as 
a theory for recovery may be one of the most important, if not the most 
important, advancements in twentieth-century contract law. Although there are 
economic justifications for promissory estoppel, the timing of its development 
rules out the possibility that Judge Posner played a role. Nevertheless, it is useful 
to examine his treatment of the doctrine to determine if he employed an 
economic rationale when applying the doctrine and the extent to which other 
courts responded to his approach. 
Remember that Judge Posner has offered two economic rationales for 
promissory estoppel.114 Similar to a tort action, the promise-maker causes the 
loss, in the form of reliance, and liability is designed to deter either promising or 
promise-breaking.115 Another theory is that we actually lower the cost of sincere 
promises by enforcing promises.116 Interestingly, there is little in Judge Posner’s 
promissory estoppel opinions that reveals an effort to promote an economic 
approach to the subject.117 One exception is that Judge Posner makes the point 
that the reliance requirement, like the consideration requirement in a standard 
contract, is evidence that a promise was actually made. In effect, the reliance 
requirement lowers administrative costs.118 This would seem to favor a narrow 
application of promissory estoppel.119 As Judge Posner argued, the statute of 
frauds applies with equal force to promissory estoppel if a promise is substituted 
for consideration.120 
This is not to say Judge Posner’s opinions on promissory estoppel have not 
been helpful to other courts, including those outside the Seventh Circuit.121 For 
example, a federal court in Pennsylvania relied on Judge Posner’s statements in 
 
114.  See supra text accompanying notes 23–25. 
115.  See Goldstick v. ICM Realty, 788 F.2d 456, 463 (7th Cir. 1986) (analogizing promissory estoppel to 
contributory negligence in torts because one party unreasonably relied on the promise of another and suffered 
loss). If one carries out the tort analogy, the idea that someone has relied unreasonably can be analogized to 
contributory negligence.  
116.  See generally Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the  
Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261 (1980). 
117.  See generally ATA Airlines, Inc. v. Fed. Express Corp., 665 F.3d 882 (7th Cir. 2011); Garwood 
Packaging, Inc. v. Allen & Co., 378 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2004); Workman v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 234 F.3d 
998 (7th Cir. 2000); Consolidation Servs., Inc. v. KeyBank Nat’l Ass’n, 185 F.3d 817 (7th Cir. 1999); Cosgrove 
v. Bartolotta, 150 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 1998); Milwaukee Auction Galleries Ltd. v. Chalk, 13 F.3d 1107 (7th Cir. 
1994); Wood v. Mid-Valley Inc., 942 F.2d 425 (7th Cir. 1991); LaSalle Nat’l Bank v. General Mills Rest. Grp., 
Inc., 854 F.2d 1050 (7th Cir. 1988). Cf. Goldstick, 788 F.2d at 468. 
118.  Garwood Packaging, Inc., 378 F.3d at 702. 
119.  Id. at 705 (narrowing the application of promissory estoppel is the view the promise be more than a 
statement of future intent). 
120.  Consolidation Servs., Inc., 185 F.3d at 822; Monetti, S.P.A. v. Anchor Hocking Corp., 931 F.2d 
1178, 1186 (7th Cir. 1991); see also Goldstick, 788 F.2d at 465 (interpreting Illinois law). 
121.  See generally Berg v. Obama, 574 F. Supp. 2d 509, 528–29 (E.D. Pa. 2008); Weitz C. v. Hands, 
Inc., 882 N.W.2d 659, 672 n. 35 (Neb. 2016); Jackson v. Morse, 871 A.2d 47, 53 (N.H. 2005); B&W Glass, 
Inc. v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc., 829 P.2d 809, 813 (Wy. 1992); LAHR Constr. Corp. v. J. Kozel & Son, Inc., 
640 N.Y.S.2d 957, 959 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996). 
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Garwood Packing, Inc. v. Allen & Co. that a promise must be more than a 
statement of intent.122 Similarly, a New Hampshire court found his decisions 
useful in fashioning the proper remedy in promissory estoppel cases.123 Although, 
on balance, the effect may be to narrow the application of promissory estoppel, 
there is nothing to suggest he advanced or retarded the growth of promissory 
estoppel by virtue of applying his economic theories to the doctrine. 
C. Duress & Unconscionability 
Duress and unconscionability, like good faith and interpretation, are 
malleable concepts. Thus, it would seem to be an area in which a judge’s 
personal beliefs would be revealed. The problem of fitting these doctrines into a 
systematic analysis of Judge Posner’s opinions is the lack of clear demarcation 
between when it is economically efficient to ignore consent if it is given under 
duress or unconscionable conditions, and when the contract should be enforced 
despite these claims. 
In the case of duress,124 it is more productive to think in terms of the type of 
threat leading to duress rather than the level of duress. This is consistent with the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which states “[i]f a party’s manifestation of 
assent is induced by an improper threat by the other party that leaves the victim 
no reasonable alternative, the contract is voidable by the victim.”125 If “by the 
other party” is viewed as the key language here, the Restatement and Judge 
Posner’s economic theory seem to be in sync. Remember that the economic 
objective, under Posner’s view, of applying duress to allow parties to avoid 
contracts is to discourage investments in illegitimate threats and to lessen the 
need to engage in preventive measures. In short, we deny benefits to those who 
 
122.  See Berg, 574 F. Supp. 2d at 529. 
123.  Jackson, 871 A.2d at 53. 
124.  Twenty-seven cases were found that were authored by Judge Posner and included some form of the 
words “contract” and “duress.” 
125.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). Section 176 also lists types 
of illegitimate threats: 
(1) A threat is improper if 
(a) what is threatened is a crime or a tort, or the threat itself would be a crime or a tort if it 
resulted in obtaining property, 
(b) what is threatened is a criminal prosecution, 
(c) what is threatened is the use of civil process and the threat is made in bad faith, or 
(d) the threat is a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing under a contract with the 
recipient. 
(2) A threat is improper if the resulting exchange is not on fair terms, and 
(a) the threatened act would harm the recipient and would not significantly benefit the party 
making the threat, 
(b) the effectiveness of the threat in inducing the manifestation of assent is significantly 
increased by prior unfair dealing by the party making the threat, or 
(c) what is threatened is otherwise a use of power for illegitimate ends.  
Id. § 176.  
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create and profit from duress that they have caused. This is different than taking 
advantage of duress the contracting party did not cause. Under Posner’s view, a 
weaker party may be under duress, but if the party with whom he or she is 
contracting does not cause that duress, there is no basis for allowing avoidance. 
For example, in Selmer Co. v. Blakeslee-Midwest Co., a subcontractor (Selmer) 
agreed to complete a project for a general contractor.126 Because of the breach by 
the general contractor, Selmer could have stopped performance but agreed to 
continue with the understanding that the general contractor would pay the extra 
costs incurred because of the breach.127 At the end of the project, Selmer 
demanded $120,000 and the general contractor offered $67,000, which Selmer 
accepted because of his dire financial condition.128 Later, Selmer sued for the 
balance arguing that he had been under duress.129 Judge Posner held that duress 
was not present because the defendant was not responsible for the plaintiff’s 
weakened position.130 He distinguished this case from another where the stronger 
party conceded that it owed the higher amount and settled the debt for pennies on 
the dollar.131 
It is inaccurate to say that Judge Posner influenced the law of duress. His 
positions generally reflect the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. On the other 
hand, if courts regard the Restatement’s position on duress as flexible and, thus, 
ranging from interpretations that result in the rare use of duress to interpretations 
that employ a more liberal use of duress, then Posner falls within the group that 
rarely uses duress. His writings justify this position in two ways. First, he notes 
that consistent advantage-taking may result in reputational harm and, thus, is 
discouraged without judicial action. In addition, some of what we regard as 
unfair may actually, as in form contracts, result in cost savings.132 In any event, 
an examination of citations to Judge Posner’s views on duress reveal little 
reliance by other courts generally and no specific mention of his economic 
theories.133 
 
126.  704 F.2d 924, 926 (7th Cir. 1983). 
127.  Id. 
128.  Id. 
129.  Id. 
130.  Id. at 928. 
131.  Selmer Co., 704 F.2d at 926; see generally Resolution Tr. Corp. v. Ruggiero, 977 F.2d 309, 314 (7th 
Cir. 1992); Amoco Oil Co. v. Ashcraft, 791 F.2d 519, 523 (7th Cir. 1986); Am. Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hosp. 
Prods. Ltd.,780 F.2d 589, 599 (7th Cir. 1986). 
132.  ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 1, at 124. 
133.  An examination of three cases—Amoco Oil Co. v. Ashcraft, 791 F.2d 519 (7th Cir. 1986); Selmer 
Co. v. Blakeslee-Midwest Co., 704 F.2d 924, 926 (7th Cir. 1983); Oxxford Clothes XX, Inc. v. Expediters 
International of Washington, Inc., 127 F.3d 574 (7th Cir. 1997)—in which Judge Posner discussed duress 
revealed that they have been cited four times for the discussion of duress. In none of those instances is the 
Judge’s economic rationale mentioned. See Progressive Bros. Constr. Co. v. United States, 16 Cl. Ct. 549, 553 
(1989); Laidman v. Clark, No. 2:11-CV-00704-LRH-PAL, 2013 WL 508169, at *4–5 (D. Nev. Feb. 8, 2013); 
Corp. Aviation Concepts, Inc. v. Multi-Serv. Aviation Corp., No. Civ.A.03-3020, 2005 WL 1693931, at *5 
(E.D. Pa. July 19, 2005); Nev. Ass’n Servs., Inc. v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 338 P.3d 1250, 1256–57 (Nev. 2014).  
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Posner’s approach to unconscionability is narrow.134 Remember that Posner 
takes the position that it is dangerous to allow those who must sign form 
contracts or those who would claim unconscionability to avoid their contracts.135 
Generally, form contracts may lower the costs to consumers. Excessively liberal 
use of conscionability may deter practices that are ultimately beneficial to 
consumers. He writes: 
Suppose that for reasons unrelated to any conduct by the promisee the 
promisor has very restricted opportunities. Maybe he is so poor that he 
can be induced to sell the clothes off his back for a pittance, or is such a 
poor credit risk that he can be made . . . to pay an extraordinarily high 
interest rate to borrow money that he wants desperately. Does he have a 
“meaningful choice” in such circumstances? If not he may actually be 
made worse off by a rule of nonenforcement of hard bargains; for, 
knowing that a contract with him will not be enforced, merchants may be 
unwilling to buy his clothes or lend him money.136 
Similarly, “there must be a showing of deception, lack of agreement, compulsion, 
or some other element of real oppression.”137 Also, Judge Posner is emphatic that 
unconscionability does not protect sophisticated parties.138 
A total of 156 cases include the terms “Judge Posner” and “unconscionab!” 
None of these cases—regardless of their ruling on unconscionability—cite Judge 
Posner for the general proposition that a finding of unconscionability may make 
those who otherwise qualify worse off. The Ashcraft decision, quoted above, 
appears to be Judge Posner’s most precise explanation in a judicial opinion for 
being wary of applying unconscionability and, notably, occurred early in his 
tenure. In Ashcraft, Posner interpreted Indiana law. The opinion has been cited 
29 times. Only three of those citations are from outside the Seventh Circuit. One 
case cites the Ashcraft opinion for Posner’s assertion that Indiana law is 
“unfriendly” to unconscionability.139 A second cite seems to rely marginally on 
the substance of Judge Posner’s reasoning.140 In sum, courts may or may not be 
increasingly receptive to unconscionability, but there is little evidence that Judge 
 
134.  Thirty-nine cases were found in which Judge Posner wrote an opinion that included some form of 
the words contract and unconscionability. Many of these did not involve unconscionability as a basis for 
avoidance.  
135.  ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 1, at 125–26. 
136.  Amoco Oil Co. v. Ashcraft, 791 F.2d 519, 522 (7th Cir. 1986). 
137.  Sarnoff v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 798 F.2d 1075, 1082 (7th Cir. 1986) (interpreting Illinois law).  
138.  Stephan v. Goldinger, 325 F.3d 874, 877 (7th Cir. 2003); Northrop Corp. v. Litronic Indus., 29 F.3d 
1173, 1180 (7th Cir. 1994); Original Great Am. Chocolate Chip Cookie Co. v. River Valley Cookies Ltd., 970 
F.2d 273, 281 (7th Cir. 1992). 
139.  Smith v. Xlibris Publ’g, No. 15-cv-5334 (DLI)(RER), 2016 WL 5678566, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 
2016). 
140.  Travel Servs. Network, Inc. v. Presidential Fin. Corp. of Mass., 959 F. Supp. 135, 142 (D. Conn. 
1997).  
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Posner’s opinions (or writings for that matter) played a role. 
D. Remedies 
In both his scholarly writings and his opinions, Judge Posner is clearly a 
proponent of the view that damages equal to expectancy encourage the “efficient 
breach.”141 As far as judicial opinions, he first mentions “efficient breach” in a 
1986 opinion, Northern Indiana Public Service Co. v. Carbon County Coal 
Co.,142 but he discussed it in even the earliest edition of Economic Analysis of 
Law in 1972.143 He discusses it again in Patton v. Mid-Continent Systems, Inc., a 
1988 decision,144 and in a 1997 case, Lawyers Title Insurance Corp. v. Dearborn 
Title Corp.145 
I conducted searches that combined each of these cases individually with the 
term “efficient breach.”146 I discovered one case that cited Northern Indiana 
Public Service.147 This one case was from outside the Seventh Circuit.148 Patton 
 
141.  See supra text accompanying notes 30–35. 
142.  799 F.2d 265, 279 (7th Cir. 1986). 
143.  RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 55–59 (1st ed. 1972). The possibility seems to 
have been first noted by Robert Birmingham. See generally Robert L. Birmingham, Breach of Contract, 
Damage Measures, and Economic Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 273 (1970).  
 The theory of efficient breach has received considerable criticism. See Daniel A. Farber, Reassessing the 
Economic Efficiency of Compensatory Damages for Breach of Contract, 66 VA. L. REV. 1443 (1980); Ian R. 
Macneil, Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky, 68 VA. L. REV. 947 (1982); Daniel 
Friedmann, The Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1989); Nihilistic View, supra note 55. 
144.  841 F.2d 742, 750–51 (7th Cir. 1988). 
145.  118 F.3d 1157, 1161 (7th Cir. 1997). 
146.  The actual search term was the citation to each case and “efficient breach.”  
147.  Search Results, WESTLAW, https://1.next.westlaw.com/Search/Results.html?query=advanced%3A% 
20(%22efficient%20breach%22%20%26%20%22799%20f2d%20265%22)&jurisdiction=ALLCASES&content
Type=CASE&querySubmissionGuid=i0ad62af000000164c02289d220e524cb&startIndex=1&searchId=i0ad62
af000000164c02289d220e524cb&originationContext=SearchListView&transitionType=ListViewType&contex
tData=(sc.Search) (last visited July 14, 2018) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
 The term “efficient breach” is found in 200 opinions, and in 32 instances it is found along with the term 
“Posner.” Search Results, WESTLAW, 
https://1.next.westlaw.com/Search/Results.html?query=adv%3A%20%22efficient%20breac 
h%22&jurisdiction=ALLCASES&contentType=CASE&querySubmissionGuid=i0ad62aef00000164c301d0c37
8a78650&startIndex=1&searchId=i0ad62aef00000164c301d0c378a78650&originationContext=SearchListVie
w&transitionType=ListViewType&contextData=(sc.Search) (last visited July 22, 2018) (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review); Search Results, WESTLAW, https://1.next.westlaw.com/Search/Results.ht 
ml?query=advanced%3A%20(%22efficient%20breach%22%20%26%20Posner)&jurisdiction=ALLCASES&c
ontentType=CASE&querySubmissionGuid=i0ad62aef00000164c30b851478a787f2&startIndex=1&searchId=i0
ad62aef00000164c30b851478a787f2&originationContext=SearchListView&transitionType=ListViewType&co
ntextData=(sc.Search) (last visited July 22, 2018) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).  
 Of these 30, only one appears to have been influenced by Judge Posner’s judicial writings. Freeman & 
Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co., 900 P.2d 669, 682 (Cal. 1995). Several others cited Judge Posner’s scholarship. 
See supra Part III. 
148.  Search Results, WESTLAW, https://1.next.westlaw.com/Search/Results.html?query=advanced%3A% 
20(%22efficient%20breach%22%20%26%20%22799%20f2d%20265%22)&jurisdiction=ALLCASES&content
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and “efficient breach” were found together in 15 cases, ten of which were from 
courts outside the Seventh Circuit.149 With respect to the most recent case—
Lawyers Title—there were no cites from outside the Seventh Circuit.150 
I examined the cases from outside the Seventh Circuit citing one or more of 
the Posner authored opinions and the term “efficient breach.” It is unlikely that 
Judge Posner or anyone else discussing the law on this matter has been 
responsible for a shift in the law. The efficient breach requires that damages be 
no more or less than compensatory as measured by expectancy. Since this has 
been the rule since well before the term efficient breach saw wide usage, Judge 
Posner (and others) have mainly helped rebrand expectancy. There is no 
indication that Judge Posner’s opinions have influenced a court to adopt the 
expectancy measure of damages. Instead, his writings support what already 
exists. For example, in one case citing the Judge’s opinion in Patton, a New York 
court notes: 
Underlying the compensatory damages rationale is a recognition that 
even deliberate breaches of contract are not necessarily blameworthy. 
Patton v. Mid-Continent Systems, Inc., 841 F.2d 742, 750-51 (7th 
Cir.1988) (Posner, J.). In fact, the law presumes that parties to contracts 
are rational: they chose to breach contracts because it is more efficient to 
breach and pay compensatory damages than to perform. If so, efficiency 
is promoted by allowing parties to break their promise, provided that 
they compensate the non-breaching party for actual losses.151 
Judge Posner seems to have mixed feelings about liquidated damages and 
penalty clauses. In 1985 he wrote: 
[S]ince compensatory damages should be sufficient to deter inefficient 
breaches . . . , penal damages could have no effect other than to deter 
some efficient breaches. But this overlooks the earlier point that the 
willingness to agree to a penalty clause is a way of making the promisor 
and his promise credible and may therefore be essential to inducing some 
 
Type=CASE&querySubmissionGuid=i0ad62af000000164c02289d220e524cb&startIndex=1&searchId=i0ad62
af000000164c02289d220e524cb&originationContext=SearchListView&transitionType=ListViewType&contex
tData=(sc.Search) (last visited July 14, 2018) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
 149. Search Results, WESTLAW, https://1.next.westlaw.com/Search/Results.html?query=advanced%3A% 
20(%22efficient%20breach%22%20%26%20%22841%20F.2d%20742%22)&jurisdiction=ALLCASES&conte
ntType=CASE&querySubmissionGuid=i0ad74014000001649b390710bc9b16be&startIndex=1&searchId=i0ad
74014000001649b390710bc9b16be&originationContext=SearchListView&transitionType=ListViewType&con
textData=(sc.Search) (last visited July 14, 2018) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
150.  Search Results, WESTLAW, https://1.next.westlaw.com/Search/Results.html?query=advanced%3A% 
20(%22efficient%20breach%22%20%26%20%22118%20F.3d%201157%22)&jurisdiction=ALLCASES&cont
entType=CASE&querySubmissionGuid=i0ad62af000000164c01a10cc20e523cb&startIndex=1&searchId=i0ad
62af000000164c01a10cc20e523cb&originationContext=SearchListView&transitionType=ListViewType&cont
extData=(sc.Search) (last visited July 21, 2018) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
151.  Topps Co. v. Cadbury Stani S.A.I.C., 380 F. Supp. 2d 250, 261 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
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value-maximizing contracts to be made. It also overlooks the more 
important point that the parties (always assuming they are fully 
competent) will, in deciding whether to include a penalty clause in their 
contract, weigh the gains against the costs—costs that include the 
possibility of discouraging an efficient breach somewhere down the 
road—and will include the clause only if the benefits exceed those costs 
as well as all other costs.152 
In effect, he appears to favor liquidated and even penalty clauses if the 
parties are relatively sophisticated.153 Moreover, Judge Posner claims there is an 
“emerging presumption against interpreting liquidated damages clauses as 
penalty clauses.”154 The question is whether Judge Posner’s views, as expressed 
in his opinions, have convinced other courts to be wary of finding that liquidated 
damage clauses are actually penalty clauses. This question is made more complex 
because in the latter part of the last century, both the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts155 and the Uniform Commercial Code156 took positions that likely lead 
to greater enforcement of liquidated damages clauses. 
Judge Posner’s earliest and most detailed discussion of liquidated damages 
and penalty clauses is found in Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co.157 I entered 
the citation for this case and the term “liquidated damage!” into a Westlaw 
search158 and yielded 91 cases.159 Courts outside the Seventh Circuit decided 29 
 
152.  Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1289 (7th Cir. 1985).  
153.  See XCO Int’l Inc. v. Pac. Sci. Co., 369 F.3d 998, 1002 (7th Cir. 2004). On the other hand, since he 
is typically interpreting state law, there is no indication that he tends to enforce liquidated damages clauses 
more often than if one adheres to the established standards. Lake River Corp., 769 F.2d at 1291. 
154.  XCO Int’l Inc., 369 F.3d at 1003. 
155.  Section 356 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts is as follows:  
         (1) Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but only at an 
amount that is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual loss caused by the breach and 
the difficulties of proof of loss. A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is 
unenforceable on grounds of public policy as a penalty. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
156.  Section 2-718 of the U.C.C. reads as follows: 
       Liquidation or Limitation of Damages; Deposits. 
        (1) Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but only at an 
amount which is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach, 
the difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining 
an adequate remedy. A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is void as a penalty. 
U.C.C. § 2-718 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010). 
157.  769 F.2d 1284, 1289 (7th Cir. 1985). 
158.  The search term was: “769 F.2d 1284” & “liquidated damages.” 
159.  Search Results, WESTLAW, https://1.next.westlaw.com/Search/Results.html?query=advanced%3A 
%20(%22liquidated%20damage!%22%20%26%20%22769%20F.2d%201284%22)&jurisdiction=ALLCASES
&contentType=CASE&querySubmissionGuid=i0ad62af000000164c05180c320e528a2&startIndex=1&searchId
=i0ad62af000000164c05180c320e528a2&originationContext=SearchListView&transitionType=ListViewType
&contextData=(sc.Search) (last visited July 21, 2018) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
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of these cases.160 The most common citation to Judge Posner’s opinion concerns 
a statement about Illinois law.161 There is some use of Judge Posner’s opinion to 
support more liberal enforcement of liquidated damages.162 Generally, though, it 
would probably be a stretch to link any greater receptivity to liquidated damages 
to Judge Posner’s dicta. 
Judge Posner also wrote extensively in his judicial opinions about the costs 
and benefit of specific performance and injunctive relief.163 His most complete 
statement in a judicial opinion is found in Walgreen Co. v. Sarah Creek Property 
Co., B.V.,164 in which the plaintiff-drugstore (Walgreen) sought to enjoin the 
shopping store owner from leasing to a competing drugstore (Phar-Mor). The 
terms of the lease prevented this.165 In his analysis, Judge Posner applied a 
Coasian analysis and observed: 
Suppose the cost to Walgreen of facing the competition of Phar–Mor at 
the Southgate Mall would be $1 million, and the benefit to Sara Creek of 
leasing to Phar–Mor would be $2 million. Then at any price between 
those figures for a waiver of Walgreen’s injunctive right both parties 
would be better off, and we expect parties to bargain around a judicial 
assignment of legal rights if the assignment is inefficient.166 
Judge Posner’s statement means that courts should be more willing to grant 
specific relief. On the other hand, Judge Posner is quick to note that conditions of 
bilateral monopoly may prevent the exchanges from taking place.167 Thus, it 
cannot be said that his economic analysis cuts one way or the other with respect 
to the availability of specific relief. Judge Posner’s discussion does provide an 
innovative way to think about the issue. 
The opinion has been cited 85 times in total and 23 times by courts outside 
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.168 In most instances the citations are to 
 
160.  The search term used was “966 F.2d 273” and either “specific performance” or “injunct!” Search 
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161.  See, e.g., John Hancock Life Ins. v. Abbott Lab., 863 F.3d 23, 42–43 (1st Cir. 2017); In re 
Montgomery Ward Holding Corp., 326 F.3d 383, 391 (3d Cir. 2003). 
162.  Some exceptions are Cal. & Hawaiian Sugar Co. v. Sun Ship, Inc., 794 F.2d 1433, 1438 (9th Cir. 
1986); Sutton v. Epperson, 631 So. 2d 832, 835 (Ala. 1993); Spirit Locker, Inc. v. EVO Direct, LLC, 696 F. 
Supp. 2d 296, 306 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).  
163.  See generally Walgreen Co. v. Sara Creek Property Co., B.V., 966 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1992). 
164.  Id. at 274.  
165.  Id. 
166.  Id. at 276 (affirming lower court’s granting of an injunction). 
167.  Id. 
168.  The search term used was “966 F.2d 273” and either “specific performance” or “injunct!” Search 
Results, WESTLAW, https://1.next.westlaw.com/Search/Results.html?query=advanced%3A%20(%22966%20F. 
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language in the opinion explaining the availability of injunctive relief 
generally.169 Nevertheless, a couple of cases are notable because they seem to 
embrace the Coasian analysis explained by Judge Posner.170 In a Ninth Circuit 
case, Rincon Band of Luiseno Mission Indians of the Rincon Reservation v. 
Schwarzenegger,171 the dissent discusses the Coasian analysis at length.172 
Similar analysis is found in United States v. One Rural Lot Identified as FINCA 
No. 5991 Located in Barrio Pueblo, Puerto Rico.173 Despite these two cases, it 
cannot be concluded that the Coasian analysis, as explained by Judge Posner, has 
found its way into judicial considerations of specific performance. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Empirical work can be quite subjective and this effort is no exception. I made 
decisions about methodology and classifications which could have gone 
differently. Here, the effort was to assess the impact of Richard Posner’s 
scholarship and judicial opinions on modern contract law. Given the massive 
citation of his work by legal scholars, one would expect he would have an 
impact. In addition, the impact would be in the direction of making contract law 
more efficient by one measure or another. On the other hand, Posner writes that 
the common law is already efficient and his work on contract law, specifically, is 
probably best regarded as a defense of the status quo. 
So, what can be said of Judge Posner’s actual contributions to contract law? 
His contributions to contract law are comparable to minor donations to an already 
established substantial endowment. The donations have often been in the form of 
rationales for justifying existing contract law. Four particulars stand out to this 
researcher: 
1.  Although Judge Posner did not invent the notion of the efficient breach, it 
seems clear that his articulation of efficient breach has meant that courts have a 
new justification for the expectancy measure of damages. 
2.  Although the common law seems to have consistently filled gaps in 
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dissenting); U.S. v. FINCA No. 5991, 726 F. Supp. 2d 61, 74–75 (D.P.R. 2010). 
171.  602 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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contracts with the terms the parties would have agreed to, it appears that Judge 
Posner has successfully promoted this idea. 
3.  Judge Posner has provided support for courts already disposed to not look 
closely at the distributive impact of contracts or to apply doctrines like duress 
and unconscionability to achieve more equitable distributive outcomes. 
4.  Judge Posner provides a rationale for the enforcement of penalty clauses 
that is available to lower courts to justify a departure from the standard rules 
against enforcing those clauses. 
 
* * *
